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ABSTRACT
We present a software approach to mitigate access-driven
side-channel attacks that leverage last-level caches
(LLCs) shared across cores to leak information between
security domains (e.g., tenants in a cloud). Our approach
dynamically manages physical memory pages shared be-
tween security domains to disable sharing of LLC lines,
thus preventing “FLUSH-RELOAD” side channels via
LLCs. It also manages cacheability of memory pages
to thwart cross-tenant “PRIME-PROBE” attacks in LLCs.
We have implemented our approach as a memory man-
agement subsystem called CACHEBAR within the Linux
kernel to intervene on such side channels across con-
tainer boundaries, as containers are a common method
for enforcing tenant isolation in Platform-as-a-Service
(PaaS) clouds. Through formal verification, princi-
pled analysis, and empirical evaluation, we show that
CACHEBAR achieves strong security with small perfor-
mance overheads for PaaS workloads.
1 INTRODUCTION
An access-driven side channel is an attack by which
an attacker computation learns secret information about
a victim computation running on the same computer,
not by violating the logical access control implemented
by the isolation software (typically an operating sys-
tem (OS) or virtual machine monitor (VMM)) but rather
by observing the effects of the victim’s execution on
microarchitectural components it shares with the at-
tacker’s. Overwhelmingly, the components most often
used in these attacks are CPU caches. Early cache-based
side channels capable of leaking fine-grained informa-
tion (e.g., cryptographic keys) across security boundaries
used per-core caches (e.g., [30, 9, 36]), though the need
for the attacker to frequently preempt the victim to ob-
serve its effect on per-core caches renders these attacks
relatively easy to mitigate in software (e.g., [39, 31]).1
Of more concern are side channels via last-level caches
(LLCs) that are shared across cores and, in particular,
1Hyper-threading can enable the attacker to observe the victim’s
effects on per-core caches without preempting it, if both are simultane-
ously scheduled on the same core. So, potentially adversarial tenants
are generally not scheduled together (or hyper-threading is disabled) in
cloud environments, for example.
do not require preemption of the victim to extract fine-
grained information from it (e.g., [35, 37, 12, 21]).
Two varieties of LLC-based side channels capable of
extracting fine-grained information from a victim have
been demonstrated. The first such attacks were of the
FLUSH-RELOAD variety [35, 37], which requires the at-
tacker to share a physical memory page with the victim—
a common situation in a modern OS, due to shared li-
brary, copy-on-write memory management and memory
deduplication mechanisms that aim for smaller mem-
ory footprints. The attacker first FLUSHes a cache-line
sized chunk of the shared page out of the cache using
processor-specific instructions (e.g., clflush in x86
processors) and later measures the time to RELOAD (or
re-FLUSH [8]) it to infer whether this chunk was touched
(and thus loaded to the shared cache already) by the
victim. More recently, so-called PRIME-PROBE attacks
have been demonstrated via LLCs [12, 21]; these do not
require page sharing between the attacker and victim.
Rather, PRIME-PROBE attacks can be conducted when
the two programs share the same CPU cache sets. The at-
tacker PRIMEs the cache by loading its own memory into
certain cache sets. Later it PROBEs the cache by measur-
ing the time to load the same memory into the cache sets
and inferring how many cache lines in each cache set are
absent due to conflicts with the victim’s execution.
In this paper we propose a software-only defense
against these LLC-based side-channel attacks, based on
two seemingly straightforward principles. First, to defeat
FLUSH-RELOAD attacks, we propose a copy-on-access
mechanism to manage physical pages shared across mu-
tually distrusting security domains (i.e., processes, con-
tainers2, or VMs). Specifically, temporally proximate ac-
cesses to the same physical page by multiple security do-
mains results in the page being copied so that each do-
main has its own copy. In this way, a victim’s access to
its copy will be invisible to an attacker’s RELOAD in a
FLUSH-RELOAD attack. When accesses are sufficiently
spaced in time, the copies can be deduplicated to return
the overall memory footprint to its original size. Sec-
ond, to defeat PRIME-PROBE attacks, we design a mech-
anism to manage the cacheability of memory pages so as
to limit the number of lines per cache set that an attacker
2https://linuxcontainers.org/
may PROBE. In doing so, we limit the visibility of the at-
tacker into the victim’s demand for memory that maps to
that cache set. Of course, the challenge in these defenses
is in engineering them to be effective in both mitigating
LLC-based side-channels and supporting efficient execu-
tion of computations.
To demonstrate these defenses and the tradeoffs be-
tween security and efficiency that they offer, we detail
their design and implementation in a memory manage-
ment subsystem called CACHEBAR (short for “Cache
Barrier”) for the Linux kernel. CACHEBAR sup-
ports these defenses for security domains represented
as Linux containers. That is, copy-on-access to de-
fend against FLUSH-RELOAD attacks makes copies of
pages as needed to isolate temporally proximate ac-
cesses to the same page from different containers. More-
over, memory cacheability is managed so that the pro-
cesses in each container are collectively limited in the
number of lines per cache set they can PROBE. This
implementation would thus be well-suited for use in
Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) clouds that isolate cloud
customers in distinct containers; indeed, cross-container
LLC-based side channels have been demonstrated in
such clouds in the wild [37]. Our security evalua-
tions show that CACHEBAR mitigates cache-based side-
channel attacks, and our performance evaluation indi-
cates that CACHEBAR imposes very modest overheads
on PaaS workloads.
To summarize, we contribute:
• A novel copy-on-access mechanism to manage phys-
ical memory pages shared by distrusting tenants to
prevent FLUSH-RELOAD side-channel attacks, and
its formal verification using model checking.
• A novel mechanism to dynamically maintain queues
of cacheable memory pages so as to limit the cache
lines a malicious tenant may access in PRIME-PROBE
attacks, and a principled derivation of its parameters
to balance security and performance.
• Implementation of both mechanisms in a mainstream
Linux operating system kernel and an extensive secu-
rity and performance evaluation for PaaS workloads.
2 RELATED WORK
Numerous proposals have sought to mitigate cache-
based side channels with low overhead through redesign
of the cache hardware, e.g., [24, 15, 33, 13, 20]. Un-
fortunately, there is little evidence that mainstream CPU
manufacturers will deploy such defenses in the foresee-
able future, and even if they did, it would be years be-
fore these defenses permeated the installed computing
base. Other proposals modify applications to better pro-
tect secrets from side-channel attacks. These solutions
range from tools to limit branching on sensitive data
(e.g., [3, 4]) to application-specific side-channel-free im-
plementations (e.g., [16]). These techniques can intro-
duce substantial runtime overheads, however, and these
overheads tend to increase with the generality of the tool.
It is for this reason that we believe that systems-level
(i.e., OS- or VMM-level) defenses are the most plausible,
general defense for deployment in the foreseeable future.
With attention to cache-based side-channels specifically,
several works provide to each security domain a limited
number of designated pages that are never evicted from
the LLC (e.g., [14, 19]), thereby rendering their con-
tents immune to PRIME-PROBE and FLUSH-RELOAD
attacks. These approaches, however, require the appli-
cation developer to determine what data/instructions to
protect and then to modify the application to organize
the sensitive content into the protected pages; in contrast,
CACHEBAR seeks to protect applications holistically and
requires no application modifications. CACHEBAR also
differs in several design choices that free it from limi-
tations of prior approaches (e.g., the limitation of only
one protected page per core [14] or dependence on rel-
atively recent, Intel-specific cache optimizations [19]).
Other systems-level solutions manage memory so as to
partition the use of the LLC by different security do-
mains (e.g., [26, 27]), though these approaches preclude
memory-page and CPU-cache sharing entirely and hence
can underutilize these resources considerably.
LLC-based side channels are a particular instance of
timing side channels, and so defenses that seek to elim-
inate timing side channels are also relevant to our prob-
lem. Examples include fuzzing real-time sources on the
computer (e.g., [32]), though this impinges on legitimate
uses of real time. Since real-time counters are not the
only way to time memory fetches [34], other efforts have
sought to eliminate side-channel risks more holistically
via altering the CPU scheduler (e.g., [28, 18]) and man-
aging how tenants co-locate (e.g., [17, 38, 10, 2, 18]). In
contrast, here we focus specifically on LLC-based side
channels (vs. a larger subset of timing side-channels)—
which again are arguably the most potent known side-
channel vectors [35, 37, 12, 21]—and restrict our modi-
fications to the memory management subsystem.
3 COPY-ON-ACCESS FOR FLUSH-
RELOAD DEFENSE
The FLUSH-RELOAD attack is a highly effective LLC-
based side channel that was used, e.g., by Zhang et
al. [37] to mount fine-grained side-channel attacks in
commercial PaaS clouds. It leverages physical mem-
ory pages shared between an attacker and victim se-
curity domains, as well as the ability to evict those
pages from LLCs, using a capability such as provided
by the clflush instruction on the x86 architecture.
clflush is designed to maintain consistency between
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caches and memory for write-combined memory [11].
The attacker uses clflush, providing a virtual address
as an argument, to invalidate the cache lines occupied
by the backing physical memory. After a short time in-
terval (the “FLUSH-RELOAD interval”) during which the
victim executes, the attacker measures the time to access
the same virtual address. Based on this duration, the at-
tacker can infer whether the victim accessed that memory
during the interval.
3.1 Design
Modern operating systems, in particular Linux OS, of-
ten adopt on-demand paging and copy-on-write mecha-
nisms [6] to reduce the memory footprints of userspace
applications. In particular, copy-on-write enables multi-
ple processes to share the same set of physical memory
pages as long as none of them modify the content. If
a process writes to a shared memory page, the write will
trigger a page fault and a subsequent new page allocation
so that a private copy of page will be provided to this
process. In addition, memory merging techniques like
Kernel Same-Page Merging (KSM) [1] are also used in
Linux OS to deduplicate identical memory pages. Mem-
ory sharing, however, is one of the key factors that enable
FLUSH-RELOAD side channel attacks. Disabling mem-
ory page sharing entirely will eliminate FLUSH-RELOAD
side channels but at the cost of much larger memory foot-
prints and thus inefficient use of physical memory.
CACHEBAR adopts a design that we call copy-on-
access, which dynamically controls the sharing of physi-
cal memory pages between security domains. We desig-
nate each physical page as being in exactly one of the fol-
lowing states: UNMAPPED, EXCLUSIVE, SHARED, and
ACCESSED. An UNMAPPED page is a physical page that
is not currently in use. An EXCLUSIVE page is a physical
page that is currently used by exactly one security do-
main, but may be shared by one or multiple processes in
that domain later. A SHARED page is a physical page that
is shared by multiple security domains, i.e., mapped by
at least one process of each of the sharing domains, but
no process in any domain has accessed this physical page
recently. In contrast, an ACCESSED page is a previously
SHARED page that was recently accessed by a security
domain. The state transitions are shown in Fig. 1.
An UNMAPPED page can transition to the EXCLUSIVE
state either due to normal page mapping, or due to copy-
on-access when a page is copied into it. Unmapping a
physical page for any reason (e.g., process termination,
page swapping) will move an EXCLUSIVE page back to
the UNMAPPED state. However, mapping the current EX-
CLUSIVE page by another security domain will transit it
into the SHARED state. If all but one domain unmaps this
page, it will transition back from the SHARED state to
the EXCLUSIVE state, or ACCESSED state to the EXCLU-
Figure 1: State transition of a physical page
SIVE state. A page in the SHARED state may be shared
by more domains and remain in the same state; when any
one of the domains accesses the page, it will transition to
the ACCESSED state. An ACCESSED page can stay that
way as long as only one of security domains accesses it.
If this page is accessed by another domain, a new phys-
ical page will be allocated to make a copy of this one,
and the current page will transition to either EXCLUSIVE
or SHARED state, depending on the remaining number
of domains mapping this page. The new page will be as-
signed state EXCLUSIVE. An ACCESSED page will be re-
set to the SHARED state if it is not accessed for ∆accessed
seconds. This timeout mechanism will ensure that only
recently used pages will remain in the ACCESSED state.
Page merging may also be triggered by deduplication ser-
vices in a modern OS (e.g., KSM in Linux). This effect
is reflected by a dashed line in Fig. 1 from state EXCLU-
SIVE to SHARED. A page at any of the mapped states
(i.e., EXCLUSIVE, SHARED, ACCESSED) can transition
to UNMAPPED state for the same reason when it is a copy
of another page (not shown in the figure).
Merging duplicated pages requires some extra book-
keeping. When a page transitions from UNMAPPED to
EXCLUSIVE due to copy-on-access, the original page is
tracked by the new copy so that CACHEBAR knows with
which page to merge it when deduplicating. If the orig-
inal page is unmapped first, then one of its copies will
be designated as the new “original” page, with which
other copies will be merged in the future. The interac-
tion between copy-on-access and existing copy-on-write
mechanisms is also implicitly depicted in Fig. 1: Upon
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copy-on-write, the triggering process will first unmap the
physical page, possibly inducing a state transition (from
SHARED to EXCLUSIVE). The state of the newly mapped
physical page is maintained separately.
3.2 Implementation
At the core of copy-on-access implementation is the state
machine depicted in Fig. 1.
UNMAPPED ⇔ EXCLUSIVE ⇔ SHARED. Conven-
tional Linux kernels maintain the relationship between
processes and the physical pages they use. However,
CACHEBAR also needs to keep track of the relationship
between containers and the physical pages that the con-
tainer’s processes use. Therefore, CACHEBAR incorpo-
rates a new data structure, counter, which is conceptu-
ally a table used for recording, for each physical page, the
number of processes in each container that have Page Ta-
ble Entries (PTEs) mapped to this page. Specifically, let
counter[i,j] indicate the number of PTEs mapped
to physical page j in container i. For example, consider
five physical pages and four containers (see Table 1).
counter[1,2] = 2 indicates there are 2 processes
in container 2 that have virtual pages mapped to physi-
cal page 1. It is easy to see from counter that phys-
ical pages 1, 2, and 4 are in the SHARED or ACCESSED
state, physical page 5 is UNMAPPED and physical page
3 is EXCLUSIVE. Of course, the table counter needs
to be dynamically maintained, as containers may be cre-
ated and terminated at any time. Therefore, to implement
counter, we added one data field, a pointer to an ar-
ray with the size of the number of physical pages in the
system, in each PID namespace structure. These data
fields collectively function as the table counter.
Table 1: Example of counter: 5 pages, 4 containers
physical page
container ID 1 2 3 4
1 0 2 0 1
2 3 1 1 0
3 0 0 1 0
4 1 1 1 1
5 0 0 0 0
The counter data structure is updated and ref-
erenced in multiple places in the kernel. Specifi-
cally, in CACHEBAR we instrumented every update of
mapcount, a data field in the page structure for count-
ing PTE mappings, so that every time the kernel tracks
PTE mapping of a physical page, counter is updated
accordingly. The use of counter greatly simplifies the
process of maintaining and determining the state of a
physical page: (1) Given a container, access to a single
cell suffices to check whether a physical page is already
mapped in the container. This operation is very com-
monly used to decide if a state transition is required when
a page is mapped by a process. Without counter, such
a operation requires running through the entire reverse
Figure 2: Structure of copy-on-access page lists.
mapping process and checking whether each mapping
is from the given container. (2) Given a physical page,
it takes N accesses to counter, where N is the to-
tal number of containers, to determine which containers
have mapped to this page. This operation is commonly
used to determine the state of a physical page.
SHARED ⇒ ACCESSED. To differentiate SHARED and
ACCESSED states, one additional data field, owner, is
added (see Fig. 2) to indicate the owner of the page (a
pointer to a PID namespace structure). When the
page is in the SHARED state, its owner is NULL; oth-
erwise it points to the container that last accessed it.
All PTEs pointing to a SHARED physical page will
have a reserved Copy-On-Access (COA) bit set. There-
fore, any access to these virtual pages will induce a page
fault. When a page fault is triggered, CACHEBAR checks
if the page is present in physical memory; if so, and if
the physical page is in the SHARED state, the COA bit
of the current PTE for this page will be cleared so that
additional accesses to this physical page from the current
process will be allowed without page faults. The physical
page will also transition to the ACCESSED state.
ACCESSED ⇒ EXCLUSIVE/SHARED. If the page is al-
ready in the ACCESSED state when a domain other than
the owner accesses it, the page fault handler will allo-
cate a new physical page, copy the content of the origi-
nal page into the new page, and change the PTEs of the
processes in the accessing container so that they point to
the new page. Since multiple same-content copies in one
domain burdens both performance and memory but con-
tributes nothing for security, the fault handler will reuse
a copy belonging to that domain if it exists. After copy-
on-access, the original page can either be EXCLUSIVE or
SHARED. All copy pages are anonymous-mapped, since
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only a single file-mapped page for the same file section
is allowed.
A transition from the ACCESSED state to SHARED or
EXCLUSIVE state can also be triggered by a timeout
mechanism. CACHEBAR implements a periodic timer
(every ∆accessed = 1s). Upon timer expiration, all phys-
ical pages in the ∆accessed state that were not accessed
during this ∆accessed interval will be reset to the SHARED
state by clearing its owner field, so that pages that are
infrequently accessed are less likely to trigger copy-on-
access. If an ACCESSED page is found for which its
counter shows the number of domains mapped to it
is 1, then the daemon instead clears the COA bit of all
PTEs for that page and marks the page EXCLUSIVE.
Instead of keeping a list of ACCESSED pages,
CACHEBAR maintains a list of pages that are in the
SHARED or ACCESSED state, denotedoriginal list
(shown in Fig. 2). Each node in the list also main-
tains a list of copies of the page it represents, dubbed
copy list, which could be empty. Both lists are
doubly linked. A tracking pointer track ptr to the
copy list or original list node is added in the
struct page structure to attach the list onto the array
of data structures that represent physical pages. When-
ever a copy is made from the page upon copy-on-access,
the copy page is inserted into the copy list of the
original page. Whenever a physical page transitions to
the UNMAPPED state, it will be removed from whichever
of original list or copy list it is contained in.
In the former case, CACHEBAR will designate a copy
page of the original page as the new original page and
adjust the lists accordingly.
Every ∆accessed seconds, CACHEBAR will traverse the
original list. If the visited page is in the AC-
CESSED state, the timer interrupt handler will check
whether it has been accessed since the last such check
by seeing if the ACCESSED bit of any PTE for this page
in the owner container is set. If not, CACHEBAR will
transition this page back to the SHARED state. In any
case, the ACCESSED bit in the PTEs will be cleared.
For security reasons that will be explained in Sec. 3.3,
we further require flushing the entire memory page out of
the cache after transitioning a page from the ACCESSED
state to the SHARED state due to this timeout mechanism.
This page-flushing procedure is implemented by issuing
clflush on each of the memory blocks of any virtual
page that maps to this physical page.
State transition upon clflush. The clflush in-
struction is subject to the same permission checks as a
memory load, will trigger the same page faults,3 and will
similarly set the ACCESSED bit in the PTE of its argu-
3We empirically confirmed this by executing clflush instructions
on memory pages with PTE reserved bits set.
ment [11]. As such, each FLUSH via clflush triggers
the same transitions (e.g., from SHARED to ACCESSED,
and from ACCESSED to an EXCLUSIVE copy) as a
RELOAD in our implementation, meaning that this de-
fense is equally effective against both FLUSH-RELOAD
and FLUSH-FLUSH [8] attacks.
Page deduplication. To mitigate the impact of copy-
on-access on the size of memory, CACHEBAR imple-
ments a less frequent timer (every∆copy = 10×∆accessed
seconds) to periodically merge the page copies with
their original pages. Within the timer interrupt han-
dler, original list and each copy list are tra-
versed similarly to the “ACCESSED ⇒ SHARED” transi-
tion description above, though the ACCESSED bit in the
PTEs of only pages that are in the EXCLUSIVE state are
checked. If a copy page has not been accessed since the
last such check (i.e., the ACCESSED bit is unset in all
PTEs pointing to it), it will be merged with its original
page (the head of the copy list). The ACCESSED
bit in the PTEs will be cleared afterwards.
When merging two pages, if the original page is
anonymous-mapped, then the copy page can be merged
by simply updating all PTEs pointing to the copy page to
instead point to the original page, and then updating the
original page’s reverse mappings to include these PTEs.
If the original page is file-mapped, then the merging pro-
cess is more intricate, additionally involving the creation
of a new virtual memory area (vma structure) that maps
to the original page’s file position and using this structure
to replace the virtual memory area of the (anonymous)
copy page in the relevant task structure.
For security reasons, merging of two pages requires
flushing the original physical page from the LLC. We
will elaborate on this point in Sec. 3.3.
Interacting with KSM. Page deduplication can also be
triggered by existing memory deduplication mechanisms
(e.g., KSM). To maintain the state of the physical pages,
CACHEBAR instruments every reference to mapcount
within KSM and updates counter accordingly. In ad-
dition to merging a copy page with its original, three
other types of page merging in KSM might occur: (1)
an original page is merged with a copy page on a differ-
ent copy list; (2) a copy page is merged with another
copy page on a different copy list; (3) an original
page is merged with another original page.
We illustrate these operations in the example in
Fig. 3. Consider the initial original list and
copy lists shown in Fig. 3(a), where all of pages 1–7
have the same content. Fig. 3(b) shows the list config-
urations after copy page 5 is merged into copy page 7
by KSM, after which only page 7 is preserved and is in
the SHARED state. (Copy page 5 is unmapped and re-
moved from copy list.) Fig. 3(c) shows an original
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(a) Initial state (b) Merging page 5 into 7
(c) Merging page 1 into 6 (d) Merging page 3 into 2
Figure 3: KSM operation example
page 1 merged into a copy page 6. As a result, page
6 becomes a SHARED page, and one of page 1’s copies
(in our implementation, the first copy in the list) is des-
ignated as the new original page of the list. Fig. 3(d)
shows original page 3 being merged into original page
2. A copy page in page 3’s copy list becomes the
new original page. A physical page may be disconnected
from the original list or any copy list, which
we call untracked, if it has never entered SHARED or AC-
CESSED states. If KSM merges a page that is untracked
with a tracked page, then the untracked page will simply
be merged into the tracked page, which will transition to
the SHARED state (if not already there).
It is apparent that KSM is capable of merging
more pages than our built-in page deduplication mech-
anisms. However, CACHEBAR still relies on the
built-in page deduplication mechanisms for several rea-
sons. First, KSM can merge only anonymous-mapped
pages, while CACHEBAR needs to frequently merge an
anonymous-mapped page (a copy) with a file-mapped
page (the original). Second, KSM may not be en-
abled in certain settings, which will lead to ever growing
copy lists. Third, KSM needs to compare page con-
tents byte-by-byte before merging two identical pages,
whereas CACHEBAR deduplicates pages on the same
copy list, avoiding the expensive page content com-
parison.
3.3 Security
Copy-on-access is intuitively secure by design, as no two
security domains may access the same physical page at
the same time, rendering FLUSH-RELOAD attacks seem-
ingly impossible. To show security formally, we sub-
jected our design to model checking in order to prove
that copy-on-access is secure against FLUSH-RELOAD
attacks. Model checking is an approach to formally ver-
ify a specification of a finite-state concurrent system ex-
pressed as temporal logic formulas, by traversing the
finite-state machine defined by the model. In our study,
we used the Spin model checker, which offers efficient
ways to model concurrent systems and verify temporal
logic specifications.
Prior works have proposed the use of model checking
to evaluate whether software is vulnerable to remote tim-
ing attacks (e.g., [29]). However, using model checking
to verify that a system is secure against the side-channel
attacks of concern in this paper is, we believe, novel and
might be of interest in its own right.
System modeling. We model a physical page in Fig. 1
using a byte variable in the PROMELA programming lan-
guage, and two physical pages as an array of two such
variables, named pages. We model two security do-
mains (e.g., containers), an attacker domain and a victim
domain, as two processes in PROMELA. Each process
maps a virtual page, virt, to one of the physical pages.
The virtual page is modeled as an index to the pages[ ]
array; initially virt for both the attacker and the vic-
tim point to the first physical page (i.e., virt is 0). The
victim process repeatedly sets pages[virt] to 1, sim-
ulating a memory access that brings pages[virt] into
cache. The attacker process FLUSHes the virtual page by
assigning 0 to pages[virt] and RELOADs it by assign-
ing 1 to pages[virt] after testing if it already equals to
1. Both the FLUSH and RELOAD operations are modeled
as atomic to simplify the state exploration.
We track the state and owner of the first physical page
using another two variables, state and owner. The first
page is initially in the SHARED state (state is SHARED),
and state transitions in Fig. 1 are implemented by each
process when they access the memory. For example,
the RELOAD code snippet run by the attacker is shown
in Fig. 4. If the attacker has access to the shared page
(Line 3), versus an exclusive copy (Line 16), then it
simulates an access to the page, which either moves the
state of the page to ACCESSED (Line 10) if the state was
SHARED (Line 9) or to EXCLUSIVE (Line 14) after mak-
ing a copy (Line 13) if the state was already ACCESSED
and not owned by the attacker (Line 12). Leakage is de-
tected if pages[virt] is 1 prior to the attacker setting it
as such (Line 19), which the attacker tests in Line 18.
To model the dashed lines in Fig. 1, we implemented
another process, called timer, in PROMELA that periodi-
cally transitions the physical page back to SHARED state
from ACCESSED state, and periodically with a longer in-
terval, merges the two pages by changing the value of
virt of each domain back to 0, owner to none, and
state to SHARED.
The security specification is stated as a non-
interference property. Specifically, as the attacker do-
main always first FLUSHes the memory block (sets
pages[virt] to 0) before RELOADing it (setting
pages[virt] to 1), if the non-interference property
holds, then it should follow that the attacker should al-
ways find pages[virt] to be 0 upon RELOADing the
6
1 atomic {
2 if
3 ::(virt==0) ->
4 if
5 ::(state==UNMAPPED) ->
6 assert(0)
7 ::(state==EXCLUSIVE && owner!=ATTACKER) ->
8 assert(0)
9 ::(state==SHARED) ->
10 state=ACCESSED
11 owner=ATTACKER
12 ::(state==ACCESSED && owner!=ATTACKER) ->
13 virt=1 /* copy-on-access */
14 state=EXCLUSIVE
15 fi
16 ::else -> skip
17 fi
18 assert(pages[virt]==0)
19 pages[virt]=1
20 }
Figure 4: Code snippet for RELOAD. The procedures for other mem-
ory accesses are similar.
page. The model checker checks for violation of this
property in the verification.
Automated verification. We checked the model using
Spin. Interestingly, our first model-checking attempt
suggested that the state transitions may leak information
to a FLUSH-RELOAD attacker. The leaks were caused by
the timer process that periodically transitions the model
to a SHARED state. After inspecting the design and im-
plementation, we found that there were two situations
that may cause information leaks. In the first case, when
the timer transitions the state machine to the SHARED
state from the ACCESSED state, if the prior owner of the
page was the victim and the attacker reloaded the mem-
ory right after the transition, the attacker may learn one
bit of information. In the second case, when the phys-
ical page was merged with its copy, if the owner of the
page was the victim before the page became SHARED,
the attacker may reload it and again learn one bit of in-
formation. Since in our implementation of CACHEBAR,
these two state transitions are triggered if the page (or
its copy) has not been accessed for a while (roughly
∆accessed and ∆copy seconds, respectively), the informa-
tion leakage bandwidth due to each would be approxi-
mately 1/∆accessed bits per page per second or 1/∆copy
bits per page per second, respectively.
We improved our CACHEBAR implementation to pre-
vent this leakage by enforcing LLC flushes (as described
in Sec. 3.2) upon these two periodic state transitions. We
adapted our model accordingly to reflect such changes by
adding one more instruction to assign pages[0] to be 0
right after the two timer-induced state transitions. Model
checking this refined model revealed no further informa-
tion leakage in the design.
4 CACHEABILITY MANAGEMENT FOR
PRIME-PROBE DEFENSE
Another common method to launch side-channel attacks
via caches is using PRIME-PROBE attacks, introduced
by Osvik et al. [23]. These attacks have recently been
adapted to use LLCs to great effect, e.g., [21, 12]. Un-
like a FLUSH-RELOAD attack, PRIME-PROBE attacks do
not require the attacker and victim security domains to
share pages. Rather, the attacker simply needs to access
memory so as to evict (PRIME) the contents of a cache
set and later access (PROBE) this memory again to de-
termine (by timing the accesses) how much the victim
evicted from the cache set. A potentially effective coun-
termeasure to these attacks, accordingly, is to remove the
attacker’s ability to PRIME and PROBE the whole cache
set and to predict how a victim’s demand for that set will
be reflected in the number of evictions from that set.
4.1 Design
Suppose a w-way set associative LLC, i.e., so that each
cache set has w lines. Let x be the number of cache lines
in one set that the attacker observes having been evicted
in a PRIME-PROBE interval. The PRIME-PROBE attack
is effective today because x is typically a good indicator
of the demand d that the victim security domain had for
memory that mapped to that cache set during the PRIME-
PROBE interval. In particular, if the attacker PRIMEs and
PROBEs all w lines, then it can often observe the vic-
tim’s demand d exactly, unless d > w (in which case the
attacker learns at least d ≥ w).
The alternative that we propose here is to periodically
and probabilistically reconfigure the budget ki of lines
per cache set that the security domain i can occupy. After
such a reconfiguration, the attacker’s view of the victim’s
demand d is clouded by the following three effects. First,
if the attacker is allotted a budget ka < w, then the at-
tacker will be unable to observe any evictions at all (i.e.,
x = 0) if d < w − ka.4 Second, if the victim is given
allotment kv, then any two victim demands d, d′ satisfy-
ing d > d′ ≥ kv will be indistinguishable to the attacker.
Third, the probabilistic assignment of kv results in extra
ambiguity for the attacker, since x evictions might reflect
the demand d or the budget kv, since x ≤ min{d, kv} (if
all x evictions are caused by the victim).
To enforce the budget ki of lines that security domain
i can use in a given cache set, CACHEBAR maintains for
each cache set a queue per security domain that records
which memory blocks are presently cacheable in this set
by processes in this domain. Each element in the queue
4This statement assumes a least-recently-used replacement policy
and that the victim is the only security domain that runs in the PRIME-
PROBE interval. If it was not the only security domain to run and evic-
tions were caused by another, then the ambiguity of what caused the
observable evictions will additionally cause difficulties for the attacker.
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indicates a memory block that maps to this cache set;
only blocks listed in the queue can be cached in that set.
The queue is maintained with a least recently used (LRU)
replacement algorithm. That is, whenever a new memory
block is accessed, it will replace the memory block in the
corresponding queue that is the least recently used.
4.2 Implementation
Implementation of cacheable queues is processor micro-
architecture dependent. Here we focus our attention on
Intel x86 processors, which appears to be more vulnera-
ble to PRIME-PROBE attacks due to their inclusive last-
level cache [21]. As x86 architectures only support mem-
ory management at the page granularity (e.g., by ma-
nipulating the PTEs to cause page faults), CACHEBAR
controls the cacheability of memory blocks at page gran-
ularity. CACHEBAR uses reserved bits in each PTE to
manage the cacheability of, and to track accesses to, the
physical page to which it points, since a reserved bit set
in a PTE induces a page fault upon access to the asso-
ciated virtual page, for which the backing physical page
cannot be retrieved or cached (if it is not already) before
the bit is cleared [11, 25]. We hence use the term domain-
cacheable to refer to a physical page that is “cacheable”
in the view of all processes in a particular security do-
main, which is implemented by modifying all relevant
PTEs (to have no reserved bits set) in the processes of
that security domain. By definition, a physical page that
is domain-cacheable to one container may not necessar-
ily be domain-cacheable to another.
To ensure that no more than ki memory blocks from
all processes in container i can occupy lines in a given
cache set, CACHEBAR ensures that no more than ki
of those processes’ physical memory pages, of which
contents can be stored in that cache set, are domain-
cacheable at any point in time. Physical memory pages
of which contents can be stored in the same cache set are
said to be of the same color, and so to implement this
property, CACHEBAR maintains, per container and per
color (rather than per cache set), one cacheable queue,
each element of which is a physical memory page that
is domain-cacheable in this container. Since the mem-
ory blocks in each physical page map to different cache
sets,5 limiting the domain-cacheable pages of a color to
ki also limits the number of cache lines that blocks from
these pages can occupy in the same cache set to ki.
To implement a non-domain-cacheable memory page,
CACHEBAR sets one of the reserved bits, which we de-
note by NC, in the PTE for each virtual page in the do-
main mapped to that physical page. As such, accesses
to any of these virtual pages will be trapped into the ker-
nel and handled by the page fault handler. Upon detect-
5In this way, the cache contention arising from accesses in the same
page are minimized.
Figure 6: Page fault handler for CACHEBAR.
ing page faults of this type, the page fault handler will
move the accessed physical page into the correspond-
ing cacheable queue, clear the NC bit in the current
PTE6, and remove a least recently used physical page
from the cacheable queue and set the NC bits in this
domain’s PTEs mapped to that page. A physical page
removed from the cacheable queue will be flushed out
of the cache using clflush instructions on all of its
memory blocks to ensure that no residue remains in the
cache. CACHEBAR will flush the translation lookaside
buffers (TLB) of all processors to ensure the correct-
ness of page cacheabilities every time PTEs are altered.
In this way, CACHEBAR limits the number of domain-
cacheable pages of a single color at any time to ki.
To maintain the LRU property of the cacheable queue,
a daemon periodically re-sorts the queue in descend-
ing order of recent access count. Specifically, the dae-
mon traverses the domain’s PTEs mapped to the physical
frame within that domain’s queue and counts the num-
ber having their ACCESSED bit set, after which it clears
these ACCESSED bits. It then orders the physical pages
in the cacheable queue by this count (see Fig. 5). In our
present implementation, this daemon is the same daemon
that resets pages from the ACCESSED state to SHARED
state (see Sec. 3), which already checks and resets the
ACCESSED bits in copies’ PTEs. Again, this daemon
runs every ∆accessed = 1s seconds in our implementa-
tion. This daemon also performs the task of resetting ki
for each security domain i, which in our present imple-
mentation it does every tenth time it runs.
Interacting with copy-on-access. The cacheable queues
work closely with the copy-on-access mechanisms. In
particular, as both the COA and NC bits may trigger a
page fault upon page accesses, the page handler logic
must incorporate both (shown in Fig. 6). First, a page
fault is handled as normal unless it is due to one of the
6We avoid the overhead of traversing all PTEs in the container that
map to this physical page. Access to those virtual pages will trigger
page faults to make these updates without altering the cacheable queue.
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Figure 5: A cacheable queue for one page
color in a domain: (a) access to page 24
brings the page into the queue and clears the
NC bit (“← 0”) in the PTE triggering the
fault; periodically, (b) a daemon counts, per
page, the ACCESSED bits (“+0”, “+1”) in
the domain’s PTEs referring to that page and
(c) reorders the pages in the queue accord-
ingly; to make room for a new page, (d)
the NC bits in PTEs pointing to the least re-
cently used page are set (“← 1”), and the
page is removed from the queue.
reserved bits set in the PTE. As CACHEBAR is the only
source of reserved bits, it takes over page fault handling
from this point. CACHEBAR first checks the COA bit in
the PTE. If it is set, the corresponding physical page is ei-
ther SHARED, in which case it will be transitioned to AC-
CESSED, or ACCESSED, in which case it will be copied.
CACHEBAR then clears the COA bit and, if no other re-
served bits are set, the fault handler returns. Otherwise,
if the NC bit is set, the associated physical page is not in
the cacheable queue for its domain, and so CACHEBAR
enqueues the page and, if the queue is full, removes the
least-recently-used page from the queue. If the NC bit is
clear, this page fault is caused by unknown reasons and
CACHEBAR turns control over to the generic handler for
reserved bits.
4.3 Security
Recall that ki is the number of cache lines in a certain
cache set that is made available to security domain i for
a period of time. While the budget ki is in effect, each
access to a memory block that maps to this cache set,
beyond the in-queue ki memory blocks, will incur a page
fault (because they are all in different pages). Because
the page-fault processing time will overwhelm the timing
granularity of modern PRIME-PROBE attacks by an order
of magnitude, the attacker i realistically needs to restrict
himself to accessing ki pages in his PROBE phase and
hence to occupying ki lines in that cache set.
The security of this design hinges critically on how
each ki is set by the daemon. When ki is reset, it is drawn
from a distribution. In the remainder of this section we
present how this distribution is determined.
Suppose there are (at most) m security domains on a
host that are owned by the attacker—which might be all
security domains on the host except the victim—and let
w be the number of LLC cache lines per cache set. Be-
low we consider security domain 0 to be the “victim”
domain being subjected to PRIME-PROBE attacks by the
“attacker” domains 1, . . . ,m. Of course, the attacker do-
mains make use of all
∑m
i=1 ki cache lines available to
them for conducting their PRIME-PROBE attacks.
Periodically, CACHEBAR draws a new value ki for
each security domain i. This drawing is memoryless and
independent of the draws for other security domains. Let
Ki denote the random variable distributed according to
how ki is determined. The random variables that we pre-
sume can be observed by the attacker domains include
K1, . . . ,Km; let Ka = min {w,
∑m
i=1Ki} denote the
number of cache lines allocated to the attacker domains.
We also presume that the attacker can accurately mea-
sure the number X of the attacker’s cache lines that are
evicted during the victim’s execution.
Let Pd (E) denote the probability of event E in an
execution period during which the victim’s cache usage
would populate d lines (of this color) if it were allowed
to use all w lines, i.e., if k0 = w. We (the defender)
would like to distribute K0, . . . ,Km and thus Ka so as
to minimize the statistical distance between eviction dis-
tributions observable by the attacker for different victim
demands d, d′, i.e., to minimize∑
0≤d<d′≤w
∑
x
|Pd (X = x)− Pd′ (X = x) | (1)
We begin by deriving an expression for Pd (X = x).
Below we make the conservative assumption that all
evictions are caused by the victim’s behavior; in reality,
caches are far noisier. We first consider the case x = 0,
i.e., that the attacker domains observe no evictions.
Pd
(
X = 0
∣∣∣ K0 = k0
∧Ka = ka
)
=
{
1 if w ≥ ka +min{k0, d}
0 otherwise
“min{k0, d}” is used above because any victim de-
mand for memory blocks that map to this cache set
beyond k0 will back-fill the cache lines invalidated
when CACHEBAR flushes other blocks from the victim’s
cacheability queue, rather than evicting others. Since K0
and Ka are distributed independently,
Pd (X = 0) =
d∑
k0=0
w−k0∑
ka=0
P (K0 = k0) · P (Ka = ka)
+
w∑
k0=d+1
w−d∑
ka=0
P (K0 = k0) · P (Ka = ka)
(2)
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Note that we have dropped the “d” subscripts from the
probabilities on the right, since K0 and Ka are dis-
tributed independently of d. And, since K1, . . . ,Km are
independent, for ka < w,
P (Ka = ka) =
∑
k1,...,km:
k1+...+km=ka
m∏
i=1
P (Ki = ki) (3)
and
P (Ka = w) =
∑
k1,...,km:
k1+...+km≥w
m∏
i=1
P (Ki = ki) (4)
Similarly, for x ≥ 1,
Pd
(
X = x
∣∣∣ K0 = k0
∧Ka = ka
)
=


1 if x+w =
ka+min{k0, d}
0 otherwise
and so for x ≥ 1,
Pd (X = x) =
d∑
k0=0
P (K0 = k0) · P (Ka = x+w−k0)
+
w∑
k0=d+1
P (K0 = k0) · P (Ka = x+w−d)
(5)
From here, we proceed to solve for the best distri-
bution for K0, . . . ,Km to minimize Eqn. 1 subject to
constraints Eqns. 2–5. That is, we specify constraints
Eqns. 2–5, along with
∀i, i′, k : P (Ki = k) = P (Ki′ = k) (6)
∀i :
w∑
ki=0
P (Ki = ki) = 1 (7)
∀i, ki : P (Ki = ki) ≥ 0 (8)
and then solve for each P (Ki = ki) to minimize Eqn. 1.
Unfortunately, solving to minimize Eqn. 1 alone sim-
ply results in a distribution that results in no use of the
cache at all (e.g., P (Ki = 0) = 1 for each i). As such,
we need to rule out such degenerate and “unfair” cases:
∀i : P (Ki < w/(m+ 1)) = 0 (9)
Also, to encourage cache usage, we counterbalance
Eqn. 1 with a second optimization criterion that values
greater use of the cache. We express this goal as mini-
mizing the earth mover’s distance [22, 5] from the distri-
bution that assigns P (Ki = w) = 1, i.e.,
w∑
k=0
(w − k) · P (K0 = k) (10)
As such, our final optimization problem seeks to bal-
ance Eqn. 1 and Eqn. 10. Let constant γ denote the max-
imum (i.e., worst) possible value of Eqn. 1 (i.e., when
P (Ki = w) = 1 for each i) and δ denote the maxi-
mum (i.e., worst) possible value of Eqn. 10 (i.e., when
P (Ki = 0) = 1 for each i). Then, given a parameter ǫ,
0 < ǫ < 1, our optimization computes distributions for
K0, . . . ,Km so as to minimize a value u subject to
u =
1
γ

 ∑
0≤d<d′≤w
∑
x
|Pd (X = x)− Pd′ (X = x) |


u ≥
1
δ(1 + ǫ)
(
w∑
k=0
(w − k) · P (K0 = k)
)
and constraints Eqns. 2–9.
Our evaluation in Sec. 5.2.2 and Sec. 5.3 empirically
characterizes the security and performance that result
from setting ǫ = 0.01 the default setting in CACHEBAR.
Of course, other balances could be chosen between these
concerns, though as we will see below, this setting
achieves convincing security while inducing only a mod-
est performance overhead for most PaaS workloads.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the security and performance
of CACHEBAR to validate its design and implementation.
5.1 Setup
Our testbed is a rack mounted DELL server equipped
with two 2.67GHz Intel Xeon 5550 processors. Each
processor contains 4 physical cores (hyperthreading dis-
abled) sharing an 8MB last-level cache (L3). Each
core has a 32KB L1 data and instruction cache and a
256KB L2 unified cache. The rack server is equipped
with 128GB DRAM and 1000Mbps NIC connected to a
1000Mbps ethernet.
We implemented CACHEBAR as a kernel extension
based on the Linux kernel (version 3.13.11.6) that runs
a Ubuntu 14.04 server edition. Our implementation adds
around 7000 lines of code to this mainstream Linux ker-
nel. We set up containers using Docker (version 1.7.1).
5.2 Security Evaluation
We empirically evaluated the effectiveness of
CACHEBAR in defending against both FLUSH-RELOAD
and PRIME-PROBE attacks.
5.2.1 FLUSH-RELOAD Attacks
Although we used Spin model checker to validate the
security of our copy-on-access design (Sec. 3), we em-
pirically tested our implementation to validate its effec-
tiveness. To do so, we constructed a FLUSH-RELOAD-
based covert channel between sender and receiver pro-
cesses, which were isolated in different containers. Both
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Figure 7: RELOAD timings in FLUSH-RELOAD attacks on an address
shared with the victim vs. timings on an unshared address
the sender and receiver were linked to a shared library,
libcrypto.so.1.0.0, and were pinned to run on
different cores of the same socket, thus sharing the same
last-level cache. The sender ran in a loop, repeatedly
accessing one memory location (the beginning address
of function AES decrypt()). The receiver executed
FLUSH-RELOAD attacks on the same memory address,
by first FLUSHing the memory block out of the shared
LLC with an clflush instruction and then RELOADing
the memory address by accessing it directly while mea-
suring the access latency. The interval between FLUSH
and RELOAD was set to 2500 cycles. The experiment
was run for 500,000 FLUSH-RELOAD trials. We then re-
peated this experiment with the sender accessing an un-
shared address, to form a baseline.
Fig. 7(a) shows the results of this experiment, when
run over unmodified Linux. The three horizontal lines
forming the “box” in each boxplot represents the first,
second (median), and third quartiles of the FLUSH-
RELOAD measurements; whiskers extend to cover all
points that lie within 1.5× the interquartile range. As can
be seen in this figure, the times observed by the receiver
to RELOAD the shared address were clearly separable
from the times to RELOAD the unshared address, over
unmodified Linux. With CACHEBAR enabled, however,
these measurements are no longer separable (Fig. 7(b)).
Certain corner cases are not represented in Fig. 7. For
example, we found it extremely difficult to conduct ex-
periments to capture the corner cases where FLUSH and
RELOAD takes place right before and after physical page
mergers, as described in Sec. 3.3. As such, we rely on
our manual inspection of the implementation in these
cases to check correctness and argue these corner cases
are very difficult to exploit in practice.
5.2.2 PRIME-PROBE Attacks
We evaluate the effectiveness of CACHEBAR against
PRIME-PROBE attacks by measuring its ability to inter-
fere with a simulated attack. In our simulation, a process
in an attacker container repeatedly performed PRIME-
PROBE attacks on a specific cache set, while a process in
a victim container accessed data that were retrieved into
the same cache set at the rate of d accesses per attacker
PRIME-PROBE interval. Moreover, the cache lines avail-
able to the victim container and attacker container, i.e.,
kv and ka respectively, were fixed in each experiment.
The machine architecture on which we performed
these tests had a w-way LLC with w = 16. The val-
ues ka and kv were distributed as computed in Sec. 4.3;
with this distribution, only values in {4, 5, 6, . . . , 14}
were possible. In each test with fixed kv and ka, we
allowed the victim to place a demand of (i.e., retrieve
memory blocks to fill) d ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 16} cache lines
of the cache set undergoing the PRIME-PROBE attack
by the attacker. The attacker’s goal was to classify the
victim’s demand into one of six classes: NONE = {0},
ONE = {1}, FEW = {2, 3, 4}, SOME = {5, 6, 7, 8},
LOTS = {9, 10, 11, 12}, and MOST = {13, 14, 15, 16}.
By asking the attacker to classify the victim’s demand
into only one of six classes (versus one of 16), we sub-
stantially simplified the attacker’s job.
Also to make the attacker’s job easier, we permit-
ted the attacker to know ka; i.e., the attacker trained a
different classifier per value of ka, with knowledge of
the demand d per PRIME-PROBE trial, and then tested
against additional trial results to classify unknown vic-
tim demands. Specifically, after training a naive Bayes
classifier on 500,000 PRIME-PROBE trials per (d, ka, kv)
triple, we tested it on another 500,000 trials. To filter
out PROBE readings due to page faults, excessively large
readings were discarded from our evaluation. The tests
without protection by CACHEBAR yielded the confusion
matrix in Table 8(a), with overall accuracy of 67.5%. In
this table, cells with higher numbers have lighter back-
grounds, and so the best attacker would be one who
achieves white cells along the diagonal and dark-gray
cells elsewhere. As can be seen there, classification by
the attacker was very accurate for d falling into NONE,
ONE, or LOTS; e.g., d = 1 resulted in a classification
of ONE with probability of 0.80. Some other demands
had lower accuracy, but were almost always classified
into adjacent classes; specifically, every class of victim
demand was classified correctly or as an adjacent class
(e.g., d ∈ FEW was classified as ONE, FEW, or SOME) at
least 96% of the time.
In contrast, Fig. 8(b) shows the confusion matrix
for a naive Bayes classifier trained and tested using
PRIME-PROBE trials conducted with CACHEBAR en-
abled. Specifically, these values were calculated using
P
(
class = c
∣∣ d ∈ c′)
=
∑
4≤ka,kv≤14

 P
(
class = c
∣∣∣ d ∈ c′ ∧Kv = kv
∧ Ka = ka
)
· P (Ka = ka) · P (Kv = kv)


where class denotes the classification obtained by the ad-
versary using the naive Bayes classifier; c, c′ ∈ {NONE,
ONE, FEW, SOME, LOTS, MOST}; and P (Ka = ka) and
P (Kv = kv) are calculated as described in Sec. 4.3. The
factor P
(
class = c
∣∣ d ∈ c′ ∧Kv = kv ∧Ka = ka) was
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Figure 8: Confusion matrix of naive Bayes classifier
kv
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
k
a
4 .18 .17 .17 .17 .17 .17 .17 .17 .36 .22 .33
5 .19 .17 .30 .32 .27 .27 .20 .26 .33 .46 .39
6 .17 .31 .24 .18 .21 .17 .20 .27 .43 .39 .41
7 .17 .33 .22 .22 .19 .31 .33 .33 .46 .48 .54
8 .33 .35 .32 .23 .43 .37 .43 .42 .32 .38 .49
9 .20 .26 .31 .28 .44 .38 .34 .34 .46 .39 .56
10 .41 .31 .27 .35 .50 .55 .53 .31 .53 .50 .62
11 .45 .45 .40 .45 .47 .54 .54 .57 .67 .50 .50
12 .55 .50 .59 .63 .49 .48 .54 .49 .56 .58 .57
13 .55 .53 .68 .68 .54 .65 .52 .56 .57 .66 .66
14 .53 .56 .45 .65 .46 .62 .48 .68 .55 .57 .53
Figure 9: Accuracy per values of kv and ka
measured empirically. Though space limits preclude re-
porting the full class confusion matrix for each kv, ka
pair, the accuracy of the naive Bayes classifier per kv, ka
pair, averaged over all classes c, is shown in Fig. 9. As in
Fig. 8, cells with larger values in Fig. 9 are more lightly
colored, though in this case, the diagonal has no partic-
ular significance. Rather, we would expect that when
the attacker and victim are each limited to fewer lines
in the cache set (i.e., small values of ka and kv, in the
upper left-hand corner of Fig. 9) the accuracy of the at-
tacker will suffer, whereas when the attacker and victim
are permitted to use more lines of the cache (i.e., in the
lower right-hand corner) the attacker’s accuracy would
improve. Fig. 9 supports these general trends.
Returning to Fig. 8(b), we see that CACHEBAR sub-
stantially degrades the adversary’s classification accu-
racy, which overall is only 33%. Moreover, the adversary
is not only wrong more often, but is also often “more
wrong” in those cases. That is, whereas in Fig. 8(a)
shows that each class of victim demand was classified
as that demand or an adjacent demand at least 96% of
the time, this property no longer holds true in Fig. 8(b).
Indeed, the attacker’s best case in this regard is classi-
fying victim demand LOTS, which it classifies as SOME,
LOTS, or MOST 75% of the time. In the case of a victim
demand of MOST, this number is only 47%.
5.3 Performance Evaluation
In this section we describe tests we have run to evalu-
ate the performance impact of CACHEBAR relative to
an unmodified Linux kernel. As mentioned previously,
we are motivated by side-channel prevention in PaaS
clouds, and so we focused our performance evaluation
on typical PaaS applications (primarily web servers sup-
porting various language runtimes) running together with
CACHEBAR. For the sake of space, we defer our discus-
sion on typical PaaS applications to App. A. Also, here
we report only throughput and response-time measure-
ments; other experiments to shed light on CACHEBAR’s
memory savings over prohibiting cross-container mem-
ory sharing in Linux as an alternative to copy-on-access,
can be found in App. B.
Our experiments to explored CACHEBAR’s perfor-
mance impact (1) as a function of the number of con-
tainer (and webserver) instances; (2) for different com-
binations of webserver and application language; (3) for
complex workloads characteristic of a social networking
website; and (4) for media-streaming workloads.
Webserver performance. In the first experiments, each
container ran an Apache version 2.4.7 web server with
PHP-FPM and SSL enabled. We set up one client per
server using autobench; clients were spread across
four computers, each with the same networking capabil-
ities as the (one) server computer (not to mention more
cores and memory than the server computer), to ensure
that any bottlenecks were on the server machine. Each
client repeatedly requested a web page and recorded
its achievable throughputs and response times at those
throughput rates. The content returned to each client re-
quest was the 86KB output of phpinfo().
Fig. 10 shows the throughputs and response times
when clients sent requests using SSL without reusing
connections. In particular, Fig. 10(a) shows the achieved
response rates (left axis) and response times (right axis),
averaged over all containers, as a function of offered
load when there were four containers (and so four
web servers). Bars depict average response rates run-
ning over unmodified Linux (“rate w/o CACHEBAR”)
or CACHEBAR (“rate w CACHEBAR”), and lines de-
pict average response times running over unmodified
Linux (“time w/o CACHEBAR”) or CACHEBAR (“time
w CACHEBAR”). Fig. 10(b) shows the same information
for 16 containers. As can be seen in these figures, the
throughput impact of CACHEBAR was minimal, while
the response time increased by around 20%. Fig. 10(c)
shows this information in another way, with the num-
ber of containers (and hence servers) increasing along
the horizontal-axis. In Fig. 10(c), each bar represents the
largest request rate at which the responses could keep up.
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Figure 10: Average throughput and response time per Apache +PHP-FPM web server, each in a separate container
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Figure 11: Throughput per webserver/language
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Figure 12: Response times per operation
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Figure 13: Media streaming
Webserver+language combinations. Next, we se-
lected other common webserver+app-language combina-
tions (again, see Table 2), namely Java over a Tomcat
web server, Python over Apache+cgi, Python over
Tornado, and Ruby over Puma. For each configura-
tion, we instantiated 16 containers and set each up to
dynamically generate 80KB random strings for clients.
We also did tests using another four web servers run-
ning the same Ruby application, namely Passenger,
Unicorn, Thin, and Mongrel. Fig. 11 shows the
throughput that resulted in each case, over Linux and
over CACHEBAR. As shown there, the throughput over-
heads were modest for most of the server+language com-
binations that we considered. The worst case was Python
overApache+cgi, which suffered a throughput degrada-
tion with CACHEBAR of 25%; other degradations were
much more modest.
Impact on a more complex workload. To test for ef-
fects on more complex workloads, we used the web-
server instance in CloudSuite [7] that implements a so-
cial community website written in PHP over Nginx on
our CACHEBAR-protected machine. This implementa-
tion queries a MySQL database and caches results using
Memcached; in keeping with PaaS architectures (see
App. A), the database and Memcached server were im-
plemented on another machine without CACHEBAR pro-
tection, since tenants cannot typically execute directly on
these machines. We used the Faban tool to generate
a mix of requests to the webserver, including browse
(7.9%), login (7.5%), post (24.9%), add friend
(7.3%), send msg (44.0%), register (0.8%), and
logout (7.5%). In addition, a background activity
happened on the webserver every 10s, which was ei-
ther receive msg or update with equal likelihood.
Fig. 12 shows that the responsiveness of the various com-
mon operations suffered little with CACHEBAR, suffer-
ing between 2% and 15% overhead. Three operations
(register, update, and logout) suffered greater
than 25% overhead, but these operations were rare in the
Faban workload (and presumably in practice).
Media streaming in CloudSuite. In addition to the web-
server benchmark setup used above, CloudSuite offers a
media streaming server running over Nginx that serves
3.1GB static video files at different levels of quality. We
set up a client process per server to issue a mix of re-
quests for videos at different quality levels and, through a
binary search, to find the peak request rate the server can
sustain while keeping the failure rate below a threshold.
Fig. 13 shows that CACHEBAR affected this application
least of all, in both throughput and response time.
6 CONCLUSION
Side-channel attacks via the LLC are becoming increas-
ingly efficient and powerful. To counter this growing
threat, we have presented the design of two techniques to
defend against these attacks, namely (i) copy-on-access
for physical pages shared among multiple security do-
mains, to interfere with FLUSH-RELOAD attacks, and (ii)
cacheability management for pages to limit the number
of cache lines per cache set that an adversary can oc-
cupy simultaneously, to mitigate PRIME-PROBE attacks.
We described the implementation of these techniques in
a memory-management subsystem called CACHEBAR
for Linux, to interfere with LLC-based side-channel at-
tacks across containers. We confirmed that our de-
sign mitigates side-channel attacks through formal anal-
ysis of both copy-on-access (using model checking) and
cacheability management (through probabilistic analy-
13
sis), as well as using empirical evaluations. Our experi-
ments also confirmed that the overheads of our approach
are modest for PaaS workloads, e.g., imposing a virtually
unnoticeable cost on server throughputs.
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A PLATFORM-AS-A-SERVICE CLOUD
Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) cloud is a model of cloud
computing which enables users to develop and deploy
web applications without installing and managing the re-
quired in-house hardware and software. A typical PaaS
cloud supports multiple programming languages and fa-
cilitates the integration of a variety of application mid-
dleware (e.g., data analytics, messaging, and load balanc-
ing) and databases (e.g., memcache, SQL). For instance,
the popular Heroku (heroku.com) service supports
more than ten programming languages such as Ruby,
Node.js, Python, and Java, PHP, Go, Perl, C, Erlang,
Scala, and Clojure, and provides integration of applica-
tion middleware as add-ons to facilitate data storage, mo-
bile integration, monitoring and logging, and other types
of application development. Customers of PaaS usually
need to develop their applications on local machines, and
then upload source code to the PaaS system via for test-
ing and deployment. In some cases, they are allowed
to ssh onto the remote machine and perform necessary
configuration and debugging.
In order to increase server utilization and reduce cost,
most public PaaS offerings are multi-tenant, which serve
multiple customers on the same (virtual) machine. Ten-
ants sharing the same operating system are typically iso-
lated using Linux containers. While a web application
may contain web servers, programming language run-
times, databases, and a set of middleware that enrich its
functionality, in all PaaS clouds we have studied, lan-
guage runtimes and web servers are located on differ-
ent servers from databases and middleware; web servers
controlled by different tenants may share the same OS,
however. Because users of PaaS clouds do not have the
permission to execute arbitrary code on databases and
middleware that are typically shared by multiple tenants,
the targets of the PRIME-PROBE and FLUSH-RELOAD
side-channel attacks we consider in this paper are primar-
ily web servers that supports various language runtimes,
which may be co-located with the adversary-controlled
malicious web servers on which arbitrary code can be
executed. We conducted a survey to understand the web
servers that are used in major PaaS clouds, and the pro-
gramming languages they support. The results are shown
in Table 2.
B EVALUATION OF CACHEBAR’S MEM-
ORY SAVINGS
In this appendix we test the memory footprints induced
by CACHEBAR’s copy-on-access mechanism in com-
parison to the simpler alternative of simply not shar-
ing memory between containers at all. (We caution
the reader that this simpler alternative addresses only
FLUSH-RELOAD attacks; it could not serve as a re-
placement for our PRIME-PROBE defense in Sec. 4.) To
measure the memory savings that copy-on-access offers
over disabling memory sharing between containers, we
measured the total unique physical memory pages used
across various numbers of webservers, each in its own
container, when running over (i) unmodified Linux, (ii)
Linux without cross-container memory sharing, and (iii)
CACHEBAR-enabled Linux. We used the system diagno-
sis tool smem for memory accounting, specifically by ac-
cumulating the PSS (proportional set size) field output by
smem for each process, which reports the process’ shared
memory pages divided by the number of processes shar-
ing these pages, plus its unshared memory pages.
For each platform, we incrementally grew the number
of containers, each containing a webserver, and left each
webserver idle after issuing to it a single request to con-
firm its functioning. For each number of containers, we
measured the memory usage on the machine. Fig. 14(a)
shows the memory overhead of Linux without cross-
container sharing (“nonshared-idle”) and CACHEBAR
(“CACHEBAR-idle”), computed by subtracting the mem-
ory measured for unmodified Linux from the memory
measured for each of these systems. We grew the number
of containers to 16 in each case, and then extrapolated
these measurements to larger numbers of containers us-
ing best-fit lines (“nonshared-idle-fit” and “CACHEBAR-
idle-fit”). As can be seen in Fig. 14(a), the overhead of
CACHEBAR is virtually zero, whereas the overhead of
Linux without cross-container sharing is more substan-
tial, even with negligible query load.
The memory overhead of CACHEBAR does grow
somewhat (relative to that of unmodified Linux) when
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PaaS cloud Supported server engines Supported programming languages
AppFog
www.appfog.com
Apache Tomcat, Apache HTTP, Nginx, Microsoft IIS Java, Python, PHP, Node.js, Ruby and Go
Azure
azure.microsoft.com
Apache Tomcat, Jetty, Apache HTTP, Nginx, GlassFish,
Wildfly, Jetty, Microsoft IIS
Java, Python, PHP, Node.js, and ASP.NET
DotCloud
www.dotcloud.com
Apache Tomcat, Tornado, PHP built-in webserver Java, Python, PHP, Node.js, Ruby and Go
Elastic Beanstalk
aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk
Apache Tomcat, Apache HTTP or Nginx, Passenger or
Puma, Microsoft IIS
Java, Python, PHP, Node.js, Ruby, Go, ASP.NET, and
others
Engine Yard
www.engineyard.com
Nginx, Rack, Passenger, Puma, Unicorn, Trinidad Java, PHP, Node.js, and Ruby
Google Cloud
cloud.google.com/appengine
JBoss, Wildfly, Apache Tomcat, Apache HTTP, Nginx,
Zend Server, Passenger, Mongrel, Thin, Microsoft IIS
Java, Python, PHP, Node.js, Ruby, ASP.NET and Go
Heroku
www.heroku.com
Jetty, Tornado, PHP built-in webserver, Mongrel, Thin,
Hypnotoad, Mongoose, Yaws, Mochiweb
Java, Python, PHP, Node.js, Ruby, Go, Perl, C, Er-
lang, Scala, and Clojure
HP Cloud
www.hpcloud.com
Apache, Apache TomEE, Nginx Java, Python, PHP, Node.js, Ruby, Perl, Erlang,
Scala, Clojure, ASP.NET
OpenShift
www.openshift.com
JBoss, Wildfly, Apache Tomcat, Zend Server, Vert.x Java, Python, PHP, Node.js, Ruby, Perl, Ceylon, and
others
Table 2: Server and programming-language support in various PaaS clouds
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Figure 14: Memory overhead compared with unmodified Linux
some of the servers are subjected to load. Fig. 14(b)
shows the same measures, but in an experiment in which
every fourth server was subjected to a slightly more ac-
tive (but still quite modest) load of four requests per sec-
ond. This was enough to induce CACHEBAR’s copy-
on-access mechanism to copy some memory pages, re-
sulting in a more noticeable increase in the memory
usage of the containers on CACHEBAR-enabled Linux.
Again, however, the memory overhead of CACHEBAR
was substantially less than of disabling cross-container
sharing altogether. Moreover, even at maximum through-
put load for all servers (not shown), the CACHEBAR
overhead approaches but does not exceed that of dis-
abling cross-container sharing. As such, the copy-on-
access mechanism strikes a better balance between mini-
mizing memory footprints and isolating containers from
side-channels than does simply disabling cross-container
sharing.
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